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Preface 
 
The European Forum for Urban Safety with headquarters in Paris, France (EFUS) has been 
launching, in 2006, a project on “SecuCities” with the general topic of “Cities against Ter-
rorism - Training Local Representatives in Facing Terrorism”. This project received sup-
port by the European Commission in Brussels – Directorate General Justice, Freedom and 
Security, according to the Pilot Project for Victims of Terrorism Act 2005. 
The project of Cities Against Terrorism (CAT) aimed, inter alia, to bring together in a cou-
ple of Member States of the European Union practitioners and policy makers having al-
ready experience with terrorist threats or having at least alternative experience in dealing 
with the concrete prevention of or eventually mastering actual big safety and security re-
lated events like huge sports world cups, competitions, fairs or even natural or technical 
disasters, which could be used to draw lessons for efficiently and effectively dealing with 
possible further terrorist events. Scholars were to be invited to join in, too, if and insofar 
they had particular knowledge in the field which could help to clarify present issues and to 
come to conclusions for further action being both, scientifically sound and practically ap-
plicable. 
EFUS invited institutions all over Europe to take part in the realization of its project, and to 
co-organize a national seminar. The core members were to come from local or regional 
authorities, and additional competent participants could be brought in from other State or 
National or even foreign authorities or scholarly institutions, if they were considered to be 
able to add special value to the Seminar in terms of knowledge or wisdom. In the event, 
seminars took place in England, Germany, Poland and Portugal. A final conference of all 
participant institutions and persons is being scheduled for spring 2007 in Madrid, Spain. 
The German Seminar has been co-organized by our Institute of Criminology and by EFUS 
(represented by Frédéric Esposito and Justyna Kulach) from 27-28 November, 2006 in 
Tübingen, under the general topic of “How to Deal with Terrorist Threats? Lokale Ant-
worten auf terroristische Bedrohungen”. The programme provided for plenary sessions 
with extended presentations, followed by particular workshops related to plenary topics, 
and a final plenary meeting aiming at summarizing the presentations and discussions and at 
drawing conclusions. Simultaneous translation from English into German and vice versa 
could be offered for the plenary meetings and some of the workshops. The members of the 
audience entered always in lively discussions so the plenary sessions and the workshops 
alike had seemingly a considerable impact of enhancing problem consciousness as well 
problem solving skills among the seminar participants.  
As the locally responsible co-organizers we have been expected to write, inter alia, a 
somehow condensed report about the Tübingen CAT Seminar, and to deliver it to EFUS. 
This report bears the title “How to Deal with Terrorist Threats? Major Problems and Han-
dling Opportunities for Local Authorities?”.  It will be accessible on a special EFUS web-
site, together with other reports and documents related to the CAT project. The present 
volume in the TüKrim series is based on our CAT Seminar report for EFUS. Its aim is, 
inter alia, to fulfil repeated wishes by seminar participants and other interested persons and 
institutions to receive a document providing a concise overview of the issues dealt with 
and the problems tackled during the Tübingen seminar events. 
Tübingen, January 2007: Marc Coester, Klaus Bott, and Hans-Jürgen Kerner 
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1. Introduction 
The threat of terrorism to Europe remains a concern. Over the past years, the level of acts 
committed in European countries – especially in England and Spain – has increased stead-
ily. In July 2006 the threat became also visible in Germany, when two bombs were found 
on trains. "We are now working on the basis that this was the work of a terrorist group... 
and was an attempt to kill a large number of people", said Jörg Ziercke, the chief of the 
Federal Criminal Police Authority, in August 2006.1 
The slogan “How to deal with Terrorist Threats? MajorPproblems and Handling Oppor-
tunities for local Authorities” points out the aim of the Tübingen conference as well as the 
target audience: local authority staff and elected members, employees of police, ministries 
and emergency management. For two days about 50 participants from 9 European coun-
tries and the United States discussed in a very inspiring manner and focused about terror-
ism and its prevention in cities. Organized by the Institute of Criminology of the University 
of Tübingen, the conference is one of a series being coordinated by the European Forum 
for Urban Security. 
Much of the work on the terrorist threat to cities and citizens has been based on a unidi-
mensional military model (“war against terrorism”). The participants of the Tübingen con-
ference revealed terrorism as a multidimensional phenomenon. They tried to envisage 
long-term strategies against terrorist threats and crisis management after an attack from the 
cities’ perspective in an interdisciplinary way.  
This report presents the main contents and results of the Tübingen conference based on 
lectures by international and national experts in the field of Terrorism, on working groups 
and a plenary discussion. After some general information about terrorism (see chapter 2), 
this report illustrates long-term strategies against terrorist threats on regional level in Ger-
many and possibilities of prevention from the perspective of the Central Council of Mus-
lims in Germany and the German police (see chapter 3). Concrete counter-terrorism meas-
ures from the cities’ perspective dealing with harm reduction and emergency management 
after a terrorist attack are described and discussed in chapter 4. The core results of the con-
ference are presented in the final conclusion. 
                                                 
1 BBC 2006: German bombs ‘mass murder’ bid (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5263930.stm; August 18, 
2006). 
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2. General information about terrorism 
This part of the report deals with the historical and functional aspects of terrorism in order 
to get a topic-overview. In the modern world neither cities nor states are safe from possible 
terrorist threats.  
The highly developed organization of terrorist groups, their incalculability and the weak-
ness of possible urban targets confronted with suicide-bombing terrorism are great chal-
lenges in the present time. Therefore both the analysis of certain terrorist groups and the 
analysis of certain techniques of terrorism are to be considered of importance.  
The logistics, the acquisition of material, the financial structure as well as the techniques of 
recruitment of terrorist groups become better with each successful terrorist act. In this 
chapter results and problems arising from this fact will be analyzed and discussed. 
2.1 Theoretical and practical issues in preventing terrorism2 
Terrorism as a historical fact 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, it can be traced back to the Roman occupation of Pal-
estine, 66/73 A.D. There the first historical details of terrorist techniques can be found. 
Obviously, terrorism changed a lot during the centuries, and changed in different ways in 
several countries and areas. However, in the last decades terrorists succeeded with violent 
acts in a new, global and ferocious way.  
The term "terrorism" (lat. terror: Fear, fright) is relatively young and is mentioned for the 
first time in a French dictionary from the time of the French revolution.3 Nowadays it is 
used for the description of violent, politically motivated acts with a Modus Operandi, 
which is different from usual criminality.  
There is little consent over the nature and characteristic of the term terrorism in research. It 
is however common to all terror groups to use force in order to change political structures 
to their favour and intimidate political opponents as much as possible.  
To prevent terrorist acts two fundamental concepts exist. The liberal view regards bad state 
care and abuses of power as a cause for terrorism. The conservative view sees the cause in 
a too liberal-democratic constitutional state and sees a solution of the problem in the de-
velopment of the repressive state force. 
The functionality of terrorism 
Terrorism today uses the free accessible infrastructure of modern society. In this context 
seven factors of the western institutions are aiding – even if unwillingly – to terrorism:  
1) Mobility 
2) Communication  
                                                 
2 The following comments are mainly based on the lecture “From theory to real life: Practical issues in pre-
venting terrorism” by Silvia Ciotti-Galletti, University for Foreigners, Perugia, Italy. 
3 From: www.krimlex.de  
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3) Security  
4) Democratic legal systems 
5) Access to arms 
6) Vulnerability of targets 
7) Underestimation (or misunderstanding) of threats 
 
A growing easy and quick mobility is required by the global economy, and technical evo-
lution in the field of communications (internet, cell phones etc.) are obvious. Freely usable 
and accessible, these first two factors are background for terroristic attacks and threats to-
day. Alongside the inner security of the actual terrorist group is particularly strong and 
inviolable. Terrorists are aware of the possibility of undercover law enforcement agents 
and other intelligence risks. Every single group or cell has strict directives detailing poli-
cies and procedures regarding their security. Mostly training manuals are used by the 
members of the group. Moreover, every cell has a security plan and adopts secret codes for 
the communication. All these expedients make investigation and analysis in the field of 
terrorism difficult. 
The democratic legal systems can aid terrorist in achieving their goals: respecting the 
proper investigation procedures is often time consuming, and can origin long and costly 
trials, in which the terrorists can use every guarantee and legal possibility to affirm them-
selves and their ideology (very often, in fact, they use their imprisonment to spread their 
ideas among the others detainees; therefore many terrorist cells are born in prison). In addi-
tion long trials lead to a loss of public interest, to less attention by the media, and witnesses 
can forget, die, or disappear.  
Of course democratic regulations must also be applied to terrorists. Violations and cruelties 
as in Abu Ghraib can not be accepted. Regardless however it is important to avoid giving 
aid or publicity to the terrorists’ ideas by legal procedures; and it is fundamental not to 
consent them to recruit other people while in prison, or to continue to organise attempts 
and criminal activities passing their orders from the prison to the accomplices remaining 
outside. The democratic legal system faces new challenges in times of terrorism. These 
have to cover the spectrum of terrorism and at the same time uphold the basic human 
rights. 
The access to arms and weapons today is easier for everyone than it used to be. A growth 
in mobility and communication leads to simple ways in offering or selling weapons or spe-
cific construction manuals (many explosives are easy to prepare and to use. Manuals are 
available on the internet). This applies even more for persons having connections to organ-
ized crime. Moreover, it is impossible for the state to control every target, most of all be-
cause in practice everyone and everything can be a target: in fact modern terrorists con-
sider a target not only in public or military objectives, but also the civil ones, like indus-
tries, supermarkets, offices etc. 
Finally, it has to be added that the terrorist threat is often underestimated or misunderstood: 
the difficulty to punish the persons of an attempt as single criminals and, at the same time, 
investigate and to “condemn” the terrorists and criminals behind them, leads to a problem 
of political response; if terrorism is seen as a “simple” crime, not as a threat against the 
national security and the prevention against that phenomenon is carried out only by “tradi-
tional” police activities, it will not be possible to react appropriate to modern terrorism. 
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Practical approach to preventive strategies 
First of all, there is a need of adequate laws at a national and an international level contain-
ing concrete and practical directives for law enforcement agencies. If the law is confused, 
useless or scarcely useful so will be the investigations. A law that is simply created after an 
attack, influenced by the media suggestions, without planning or coordination with previ-
ous laws, just to give a quick response to the fear of the population, it is likely to be a use-
less law (as it happened in Italy with the terrorism law: law 31st July, 2005, no. 155). 
The creation of useful laws is a duty of the legislator. Law enforcement agencies can only 
give suggestions or make specific technical requests, to avoid misunderstanding during the 
investigations or mistakes in the identification of terrorist and simple criminal phenomena. 
It is fundamental to properly analyze all crimes to avoid mixing up terrorism and non-
terrorist crimes. 
While for the organized criminal groups the mean is violence, and the final goals are profit 
and power, for the terrorist groups the mean is the money, and the final goal is violence (to 
create fear, terror, confusion, to weaken governments and formal organizations and to af-
firm their power and ideas). Therefore to follow the “traces” of terrorists a good strategy is 
to start analyzing how they finance their activities. Studies show that in many cases the 
source of the money is illegal. Very often the terrorists obtain money for their purposes 
committing crimes just as robberies, kidnappings, drug trafficking, extortions, frauds etc. 
Also other crimes, as the creation or use of false or counterfeit documents are strictly con-
nected with terrorist activities and movements. 
Terrorism can be considered by two different points of view: As a sum of crimes or as a 
whole. Viewed as a whole terrorism is a complex and unitary phenomenon, with political 
goals, having political nature and requesting political solutions. As a sum of single crime 
incidents (robbery, homicide, kidnapping etc.) terrorism should be fought and prevented by 
law enforcement agencies. In this context agencies are in charge of the analysis and repres-
sion, paying attention to the single crime incident to find links to terrorist purposes. For 
such an analysis, law enforcement agencies can use the methodology of the Problem Solv-
ing Crime Analysis, focused on the single crime incident and integrated with the specific 
tools of Problem Solving Terrorism Analysis. These tools are based on  
1)  SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment: the four stage of problem solv-
ing by H. Goldstein),  
2)  The 5 I’s (Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement, Impact by P. Ek-
blom) and  
3)  TAIT (Terrorism Analysis Intensive Tools by S. Ciotti Galletti).  
 
The use of these tools aids the agents in every fundamental stage terrorism defence plan-
ning (1. pre-incident; 2. incident; 3. post-incident). 
Every national or international law enforcement unit working in the field of terrorism 
should have at least one Problem Solving Terrorism Analyst. Especially the creation of a 
network at international level to connect all analysts to provide data and support seems 
most important. The training of the agents to become Problem Solving Terrorism Analysts 
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does not require new instruments, software, hardware or weapons but just the learning of 
new analytical tools and a new way to look at the terrorist phenomena. 
The usefulness of this methodology, and its global approach to criminal and terrorist emer-
gence, can be seen not only in preventing future possible attempts but also in practicing by 
examining relevant cases that happened in the last years (as the attack in the Tokyo subway 
1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo Japanese cult). 
Preventing terrorism in the 21st century means to use all the infrastructure and networks 
possible to react to a worldwide threat and beating the enemy with his own weapons. 
2.2 The structure of a terrorist organization4 
Because terrorism is a widespread concern challenging the modern world, no nation can 
consider itself safe from terrorism. The phenomenon of international and also domestic 
terrorism has been one of the main dilemmas of the post-Cold War era especially and in-
creasingly after the September 11 attacks in the United States. It is understood that there is 
a necessity for international collaboration, partnership and cooperation to work against 
terrorist threats. Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and PKK include 
thousands of trained activists and members, most of whom are ready to carry out armed 
activities around the globe.  
In this context Turkey has been plagued by frequent violence from terrorist activities since 
the late 1950s. Historically, various fundamental groups, including movements of both 
leftist and rightist organizations, as well as alleged separatist ethnic terrorists, have been 
responsible for terrorism in Turkey and abroad (also in the European Union). Among them 
the PKK has been the most well-known terrorist organization in the last thirty-five years. 
The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as example for a terrorist group 
The Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or PKK, Turkish: 
Kürdistan İşçi Partisi), also known as KADEK and Kongra-Gel, was founded in 1978. The 
PKK is an armed militant group with revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish 
nationalism as its ideological foundation. Its stated aim is to establish an independent 
Kurdish state in a territory (Kurdistan) that is constituted of parts of south-eastern Turkey, 
north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria and north-western Iran. To reach that aim the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL started an armed conflict in 1984. Up to now about 35,000 people 
have been killed, several of them by suicide bombing. Even the capture of the leader Ab-
dullah Öcalan cannot be assessed as a real caesura, as the activities just changed to a small 
extent: on the one hand the activities generally did decrease, but on the other hand this was 
accompanied by a shifting of the activities into foreign countries and by a decrease of their 
armed forces, particularly explosives from Iran and Iraq. 
The PKK and its sub-organizations 
The PKK/KONGRA-GEL is structured by almost countless bogus organizations: Pres-
ently, legal and illegal activities in the European Union are organized by the umbrella for-
                                                 
4 The following comments are based on the lecture “The structure of a terrorist organisation (PKK) and its 
activities in the European Union” by Ahmet S Yayla, Ankara Police Department, Antiterrorism Division, 
Turkey. 
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mation named “European People Congress”. Implementing and supervising of this forma-
tion is undertaken by another body called “Coordination of European Kurdish Democratic 
Union”, divided into four sections to coordinate the activities. The other most important 
organizations shall be briefly named: The “KON-KURD” is an ostensible humanitarian 
organization, but indeed an economic organization of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, agitating 
in 14 different European countries with altogether 413 sub-organisations. The “Kurdish 
Businessmen’s Union (KARSAZ)” is a bogus organization that is established by the terror-
ist organization for logistic and economic reason. About 1000 businessmen are working 
exclusively for this organization in Europe. The “Kurdish Red Crescent” is again a body of 
the PKK and agitating in 7 countries. Established to conceal the activities of the terrorist 
organization under different types of activities such as “humanitarian aid campaign” this 
sub-organization supports and finance different types of terrorist activities, for example 
purchasing arms, explosives and medical equipment as well as recruitment activities. 
The terrorist organization has been trying to carry out its terrorist activities abroad in a 
very large spectrum along with neighbour countries of Turkey including Iraq, Iran, Greece, 
and Armenia. Despite the aim of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL to establish a Kurdish state the 
terrorist organization does operate in EU countries as well as in Australia and Canada be-
cause many Turks live there. The international activities can be studied under three main 
headings: Propaganda, recruitment and financial activities. 
Propaganda, recruitment and financing of a terrorist group 
Media activities of the PKK have been administered and organized by the terrorist organi-
zation’s Press and Publication named “Democratic Press Union”. Directly tied to the De-
mocratic Press Union are 6 radios, 3 TV channel, 2 news agencies, 7 newspapers and 45 
magazines - 39 of these broadcasting bodies have been actively operating in Europe. The 
TV-network – even including music channels – tells clearly what has to be done. The 
global information infrastructure and agitation complicates an adequate response: if one 
newspaper is forbidden today, it will occur again tomorrow with the same content under 
another name.  
The PKK/KONGRA-GEL is spreading its doctrines on the basis of civil rights. Establish-
ing humanitarian organizations or broadcasting bodies can hardly be forbidden in constitu-
tional states. Democratic means and civic liberties are systematically exploited. 
It is well known that many Turkish reside in EU countries. The PKK takes advantage of 
this situation. The terrorist organization has established many affiliated and umbrella asso-
ciations, unions and foundations for the purpose of so called humanitarian aid, cultural and 
social activities that usually target Kurdish Ethnicity among the Turkish population for its 
propaganda in order to recruit new members and train them ideologically and doctrinally. 
The new members get a local apprenticeship in training-camps even in Europe, and then 
are travelling to Iran (that provides 14 camps) or Iraq (that provides 35 camps) to train the 
handling of explosives and arms. In that way about 5000 terrorists are now menacing the 
South of Turkey. 
All these mentioned activities swallow up an enormous amount of money. The disburse-
ments include the apprenticeship for the members, arms and munitions, logistic infrastruc-
ture and the financing of the organs. The PKK is involved in arms trade, extortion, money 
laundering, human trafficking, smuggling, charges and bounties in order to get the neces-
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sary financial means. But the most efficient source of money for the terrorist organization 
is the control of drug smuggling, especially from Syria, Iran and Iraq. For prestige reason 
the PKK itself does not deal with drugs.  
Ways to impede and constrain the activities of the PKK can be shown. Thoughts of this 
kind always have to be in accordance to human rights and UN resolutions. To check the 
refugee status of members of the PKK is as important as to consider freezing their financial 
sources. One has to sensitize the medial public to reduce the effects of PKK propaganda. 
Referring to the last two points it is necessary to appropriate more detailed knowledge 
about the organization’s financial and medial structure.  
Considering the previous points it becomes more and more clear that (new) media and 
world-wide networking must be a focal point when looking at terrorism and its prevention 
today.  
2.3 Terrorism through suicide-bombing5 
One specific form of terrorism and a global challenge as well is the threat posed by 
suicide terrorism. Not only Middle East and South Asia got affected in the past but 
since September 11 suicide terrorism reached the western world, too.  
Since the 1980s suicide attacks were witnessed in Lebanon, Kuwait and Sri Lanka, 
Israel, India, Panama, Algeria, Pakistan, Argentina, Croatia, Turkey, Tanzania and 
Kenya, USA and United Kingdom. The enhanced migration of terrorist groups from 
conflict-ridden countries, the formation of extensive international terrorist infrastruc-
tures and the increased reach of terrorist groups in the post Cold War period all af-
fected the spread of suicide terrorism to Western Europe and North America. 
Groups that are using suicide-bombing 
Suicide operations are attractive to terrorist organizations. They result in many casual-
ties, cause extensive damage, attract media coverage, guarantee the most appropriate 
time and place with regard to the circumstances at the target location, are extremely 
difficult to counter and require no escape plan. Today, there are about 10 religious and 
secular terrorist groups that are capable of using suicide terrorism as a tactic against 
their governments and/or foreign governments. These are the Islam Resistance Move-
ment (Hamas), Palestinian Islamic Jihad of the Israeli occupied territories, Hezbollah 
of Lebanon, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Gamaya Islamiya (Islamic Group - 
IG) of Egypt, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria, Barbar Khalsa International 
(BKI) of India, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, the Kurdi-
stan Worker's Party (PKK) of Turkey and the Osama bin Laden network (Al-Qaeda).  
Suicide-capable groups differ in form, size, orientation, goal and support. Some of 
these suicide groups are motivated by religion, religious/ethnic nationalism, or ethnic 
nationalism. Al-Qaeda's religious philosophy transcends territorial borders. Hamas, the 
PIJ and Hezbollah are primarily religious groups, but they are also driven by ethno-
nationalism. BKI is the only non- Islamic religious group. While the LTTE and the 
PKK are provoked by ethno-nationalism, the PKK is also infused with Marxist-
                                                 
5 The following comments are based on the lecture “Terrorism through suicide bombings” by Maria Alvanou, 
ITSTIME Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies. 
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Leninist ideology. As such, the motivation of Hamas, the PIJ and Hezbullah suicide 
bombers is primarily Islam. The motivation of the LTTE and the PKK suicide bombers 
is Tamil and Kurdish nationalism. 
Tactics and perpetrators 
Suicide terrorism is the readiness to sacrifice one's life in the process of destroying or 
attempting to destroy a target to advance a political goal. Two basic types of suicide 
bomber exist, the individual and the vehicular.  
Each type has its own advantages and limitations. The individual suicide bombers 
carry the explosive device either on their body or within an object. The major limita-
tions of individual suicide bombers are that they are only able to carry limited amounts 
of explosives and have a limited destruction range. Advantages of these bombers are 
the less demanding logistical requirements and the possibility to reach difficult targets. 
The vehicular bomb includes all motorized and non-motorized vehicles on land, air 
and sea with the potential to be turned into a suicide bomb delivery platform. The ma-
jor advantages of vehicular suicide bombing are the ability to carry large explosive 
payloads and the high level of mobility. Limitations of vehicular bombing are the in-
creased logistical needs.  
Most of the active terrorist groups that have engaged in suicide bombings use both 
individual and vehicular bombs.  The general targets of all suicide bombings are the 
general public, police and military forces, infrastructure of a country and very impor-
tant persons or symbolic venues. 
The operational advantages of suicide bombings over normal terrorist bombings are 
six-fold:  
1)  Superior dedication to the mission  
2)  The device is precisely delivered to the target  
3)  Harder targets can be attacked 
4)  No one is left alive to interrogate  
5)  No burden of wounded comrades  
6)  Psychological impact: A terror attack is a traumatic experience and produces a 
feeling of unease among the population. 
Suicide bomber preincident indicators 
No suicide bomber profile exists so far since men, women and adolescents have all 
engaged in this activity. Yet, most commonly, bombers are unmarried males between 
16 and 40 years old. To a lesser extent, females between 16 and 25 years old have en-
gaged in this activity. On a terrorist group-by-group basis, much variability exists, as 
each group has its own tactics, techniques, and protocols. Chechen terrorist groups 
have used numerous female “black widow” bombers, whereas Al-Qaeda has not. 
There are some constraints that affect the deployment of female suicide bombers.  
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As mentioned above no actual suicide bomber profile exists. Consequently everybody 
might be suspicious. This reveals the danger of discriminating against certain groups 
or innocent persons. 
Prior to the actual attack, suicide bombers seek to remain undetected by blending with 
the surrounding. This defense, based on stealth masking, is employed as they move 
against the selected target. It may be recognized by observing subtle items or actions 
that appear out of place. While any one indicator by itself may not be cause for con-
cern, multiple anomalies will signify a potential threat and help security forces prevent 
a suicide bomber from carrying out an attack. There is a checklist for observing, re-
porting, responding and investigating suicide bombing incidents. It is not designed as a 
comprehensive or complete list of all considerations in these areas but is suggestive of 
the types of common concerns that may affect police and other emergency service re-
sponders. Things that should be observed are:  
1) Behavior  
2) Appearance  
3) Smell  
4) Equipment  
5) Vehicles 
Crossing of a terror attack 
A state faced with suicide attacks must thwart these attacks through intelligence, op-
erational (counter-terrorist) and protective (anti-terrorist) measures. What is important 
for the understanding of this concept is the addition of psychological measures. Intelli-
gence is the first link in the chain of crossing any terror attack. Operational efforts 
should be diverted towards the application of pressure on elements involved in the 
overall planning and implementation of the attacks and several circles of people aware 
in advance of the plan (family, activists initiating the attack, recruiting, training of the 
perpetrator, devising the explosives, gathering operational intelligence on the target, 
guiding the perpetrator on the mission).  
New security methods should be adopted and action taken to prevent the suicide 
bomber reaching the target. Increased protective measures and the exposure of the ac-
tor before the opportunity to carry out the attack at the planned target may reduce the 
amount of damage caused and perhaps even prevent the attack. Another important 
facet is countering the moral damage of these attacks, supporting and strengthening the 
civilian population. Faced with people who are willing to level their own lives the idea 
of pertaining to action sounds close and trustworthy. The argument of being more 
practical always involves the danger of minimization of human rights and dignity. 
Confronted with the death of thousands one easily classifies human beings in worthy 
and unworthy to live. 
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3. Long-term strategies against terrorist threats 
Dealing with terrorism, the theoretical validity of analyses and knowledge about the terror-
ist groups and their methods are of particular importance. This chapter will deal with more 
practical issues in the fight against terrorism.  
New ways of communication that are used by perpetrators as well as by official authorities 
can be important for preventive and long-term strategies against terrorist threats. Contin-
gencies of working on confidence-building measures in order to reach groups with a high 
potential of terrorist recruitment is at the center of attention in this part of the report. Mi-
gration and its meaning to terrorist threats will also play a key role.  
The co-operation between different institutions (containing elements of psychology, soci-
ology, criminology and Islam science and dealing with terrorism) can become a solving 
factor in analyzing and preventing of terrorism. It is to be questioned if and how those in-
stitutions hinder themselves or in which areas they are already working together. Also the 
educational system should be involved in issues of terrorism prevention. 
3.1 Confidence-building measures6 
The Islam has become a world religion which will always stand in the context with terror. 
The central council of the Muslims in Germany (ZMD) has made a lot of experience with 
the subject “Security” dealing with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New 
York. 
The situation of Muslims in Germany 
Particularly based on the working migration in the 1960s and 1970s, there are about 3.2 
million Muslims mainly from Turkey living in Germany – about 500,000 of them are 
German citizens. Since the Islam has therefore become the third-biggest religious commu-
nity in Germany, the construction of mosques, religious lessons for the children, funeral of 
Muslims and the establishment of further Muslim institutions has been developing.  
But this development did not – and indeed could not – proceed completely without diffi-
culties: natural integration problems caused by the new and therefore to some extend am-
biguous situation for the German society became visible as well as conflicts for example in 
the working life, e.g., about the legitimacy of wearing a headscarf during labor time. With 
the terrorist attacks in the United States and the attacks in London and Madrid the discus-
sion about the integration of Muslims in Western Europe’s societies has reached a new 
intensity and quality. 
Against this background Muslim organisations in Germany have appealed to the security 
services and pointed out that the Muslims would like to intensify the dialog with the secu-
rity services and are ready to do everything within the bounds of their possibilities to guar-
antee a better security position in the society. The security services accepted this sugges-
tion and invited the Turkish-Muslim organisation DİYANET İŞLERİ TÜRK İSLAM 
BİRLİĞİ (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion; DITIB) and the Central 
                                                 
6 The following comments are based on the lecture "confidence-building measures – co-operation between 
muslims and the police in Germany" by Mounir Azzaoui, Central Council of Muslims in Germany. 
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Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland; ZMD) to a meet-
ing in September 2005.  
The result was the installation of the working group "confidence-building measures". This 
concept encloses five points which have yet been reduced to practice just to a low extend:  
1)  Installing contact persons both for the Muslims and for the security services in order to 
implement the decided measures and to organize an optimized interlinking of activities. 
2)  To abolish – or at least reduce – prejudices and reservations as well as to enable a free 
dialogue, common conversation and information arrangements should serve to inform 
the Muslims about the tasks of the security services and to enable the security services 
to get to know the self-image of the Muslims.  
3)  Supply and distribution of information in which the security services inform the popu-
lation about their tasks, measures and purposes. This can be on the one hand general in-
formation about the Islamism and Islamic terrorism, but also subjects like juvenile de-
linquency, drugs and violence in marriage. On the other hand, publications about the 
Islam, the life of the Muslims and the work of the Muslim federations shall be distrib-
uted among the security services.  
4)  Suitable teaching contents – also provided by Islam scientists – should be implemented 
in the curricula of the advanced technical colleges, the police guidance academy in 
Münster etc. in order to achieve a better education and advanced training of employees 
of the security services and to provide a basic knowledge about the Islam.  
 
5)  Equipment or announcement of so-called "tip phones" especially for Muslims which 
offer the possibility to report under assurance of the protection of the anonymity about 
the preparation of terrorist attacks, trends of radicalization and close criminal offences. 
The ZMD and the DITIB are willing to announce these phone numbers in their munici-
palities and to diminish possibly existing "threshold fears". 
Probably these concepts will play a major role within the study group dealing with the sub-
ject “Security and Islamism” which was founded after the Islam conference in September 
initiated by the Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble in order to speed up the inte-
gration of the Muslims in Germany. The specific feature of that work group is that also 
Muslim organizations which are observed by the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution are involved – an attempt to ensure a better collaboration also with probably 
radical groups.  
But the collaboration of the Muslims was met with criticism: many Muslims feel discrimi-
nated against as the impression arises that all of them are potential terrorists. On the one 
hand, these doubts are partly understandable as many terrorists specifically appeal to the 
Islam. On the other hand numerous mosque searches and many unjustified personal con-
trols cause a feeling of lacking recognition among the Muslims living their faith peace-
fully. While the Muslims are supposed to be a security problem in Europe the Muslims 
themselves sometimes feel unsafe and under general suspicion of other groups in the soci-
ety. This development prevents integration.  
To guarantee a load-bearing, long-term perspective for integration of the Muslims and the 
prevention of radicalization trends, it is important to see the Muslims even stronger than 
now as a partner. According to the Central Council of Muslims in Germany Muslims are 
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neither the reason for nor the initiator of the current problems, but they are a part of the 
solution. 
3.2 Terrorism prevention by police authorities7 
Preventive police work on federal level 
For preventive work and co-operation in Germany a Federal State Working Group (Bund-
Länder-Projektgruppe; BLPG) was built as a task force which consists of deputies from the 
Federal Government and the government of the 16 states.  
In the past years public transportation systems all around the world often had been hit by 
terrorist acts. For this reason, the special BLPG dealt with the enhancement of public 
transport safety.  
Carriers of public transportation are playing an important role in safety issues. They are 
working especially in potential “danger-zones” of traffic stations routes and vehicles. The 
BLPG pointed out necessary qualifications of the employees to show them how to handle 
danger situations and stated the needfulness to explain the actual state protection situation. 
A campaign called “Attentive en Route” (“Aufmerksam unterwegs”) was founded in order 
to sensitize passengers as well as employees for ownerless pieces of luggage. The German 
states implemented these results of the BLPG on state and on local level. 
Preventive police work on local level 
Besides implementing the results of the BLPG the state of Hesse took action in the preven-
tion of terrorism on local level. To improve the relationship between Muslims and the po-
lice, more and more police staff members with a migration background are employed. 
Among other tasks they shall advise their colleagues in individual cases, make contact to 
migrant organizations, keep in touch with them and communicate the problems which can 
occur by the interaction with Muslims.  
Additionally they can be deployed in the project “Early Detection and Combat of Islamis-
tic Structures” (Früherkennung und Bekämpfung islamistischer Strukturen; FuBiS). 
Through this project cooperation for the fight against the world-wide networked Islamist 
terrorism should be facilitated. These measures should improve the internal communica-
tion within the police.  
Furthermore a co-operation agreement between the police and the association of private 
security companies (“Bundesverband Deutscher Wach- und Sicherheitsunternehmen“) was 
set up. It was held important that for the prevention of terrorism in Germany the state au-
thorities had to work together with private security companies to enhance preventive 
measures.  
Another preventive strategy focused on the world-wide event of the FIFA World Cup 2006 
in Germany. Concrete threats on homepages of terroristic organizations led to a German-
wide security action plan. One method was the extended utilization of a so called “Helper-
Card (“Helfer-Card”). Primarily it was designed for violence prevention and in a modified 
                                                 
7 The following comments are based on the lecture "police terrorism prevention in the state of Hesse on local 
level" by Gottfried Störmer, State Office of Criminal Investigation, Hesse. 
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form conduced to the fight against terrorism. It was given to the visitors of the soccer 
games. The card showed all important safety information for Germany (telephone numbers 
of police, fire departments, hospitals etc.).   
Teamwork is necessary 
The biggest challenge in this context is the co-operation of the federal and state authorities 
in Germany in order to advance the effectiveness of prevention.  
Furthermore to take such preventive measures the police should not be left alone. Preven-
tion is a task of society and can only be carried out within a broad societal framework. Ter-
rorism is a danger to everyone. The society is a key player to deal with this problem. 
3.3 Prevention and internal communication of authorities8 
The Islamic terrorism is – not only among the politically motivated crime – actually the 
biggest challenge for the security services. Discussing this topic first of all it is important 
to distinguish clearly between the Islam with its more than one billion religious Muslims 
and the Islamic terrorism accompanied by a tendency to violence, the pursuit to establish 
an Islamic theocracy and the basic refusal of western values and basic rights.  
Germany as target-country of “self radicalized” terrorists 
Islamic terrorists are increasingly aiming at Germany. The endangerment level increases 
almost proportionally with the German military engagement abroad. The question is not if 
there will be an assault, but “when”, “who”, “where” and “how”.  
The assault attempts of Dortmund and Koblenz on July 31, 2006 make clear that the men-
ace has reached a new quality and dimension and is as concrete as never before: Two 
bombs were put into trains and should explode during full speed. Just a small construction 
mistake of their suitcase bombs has prevented the first assault in Germany. The surround-
ings of the site of this crime show two dangerous tendencies: firstly – in contrast to the 
attacks for example in Madrid or London – objectives and small places without a particular 
symbolism were aimed. And secondly the two assassins, who could be caught quite fast 
due to video surveillance at the station, again broadened the range of possible assassins.   
For the criminal prosecution authorities an equivocal culprit's profile of violent Islamists is 
not recognizable: Beside flexible networks there are so-called "homegrown" (offenders 
who grew up and who were socialized in Germany), converts (mostly men who want to 
show by attacks the strength of their faith) and Iraq repatriates with combat experience. 
But as the mentioned assault attempts show, more and more “self radicalized” as those 
assassins who were in Germany just for a short time, who have not been eyed by the inves-
tigating offices before and who are decisive within a short time can be asserted. Those two 
assassins were just lone operators without any contact to terrorist networking which, of 
course, enormously aggravates the investigations. It is hard enough to investigate in fields 
of terrorist networks, but with this new kind of “self radicalized” we are now faced with 
                                                 
8 The following comments are based on the lecture “Prevention of terrorism in the state of Baden-
Württemberg from the perspective of the police” by Klaus Ziwey, Steering Committee of the State Office of 
Criminal Investigation, Baden-Württemberg. 
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more or less invisible combatants. Because of the wide range of possible assassins the us-
ability of steady patterns is quite limited. 
The possibilities of ways of communication 
Al-Qaeda, in the meantime, does not need education camps any more to recruit terrorists. 
The Internet takes this place as a “virtual training camp”: On this virtual platform Islamists 
find everything they need, from the spiritual indoctrination for example by audio or video 
massages of famous Al-Qaeda leaders up to instructions for constructing bombs.  
In Baden-Württemberg – with about 600,000 Muslims living there – people are faced with 
a number of about 5,000 Islamists, among whom there is a low double-digit number of so 
called “Gefährder” (literally-translated: “endangerer”) – people who radically negotiate 
and combat the common values and who are therefore under steady control of security ser-
vices – and a moderate number of so called “relevant associations” and “relevant persons” 
who are supposed to be in contact with the “endangerer”. 
The internationally operating terrorists must be faced with a global answer of united secu-
rity services. In Germany there are two important elements for the necessary interlinking of 
the security services: on the one hand the Joint Terrorism Defence Centre in Berlin, a col-
laboration of different national security services that provide daily reports and acts as a 
kind of early warning system, and on the other hand the Anti-Terror Databank, which is 
going to be adjusted in 2007. There pieces of information from the 38 polices and secret 
services will be linked and saved in two different data banks with different rights of access: 
basic data such as name and address can easily be requested; requesting personal data like 
bank details, data about travelling abroad, religious affiliation, family status and profession 
requires presentation of special interest. 
Prevention by the police 
In Baden-Württemberg the aim is to integrate all organization unities from the 250 experts 
working in the field of politically motivated crime to every single police officer into the 
fight against the Islamic terrorism, dealing with five columns of safety: Beside the complex 
investigations are equally relevant:  
- A comprehensive information retrieval supported by Internet research to detect hidden 
agitating networks 
- A permanent tracing and controlling pressure – including video surveillance – especially 
concerning the endangerer and the relevant persons - also by undercover units 
- The protection of endangered objects (particularly US American bases)  
- The collaboration with Muslim municipalities and associations – there are about 150 
contact persons by the police for about 180 known mosques in Baden-Württemberg.  
In fighting terrorism the police are furthermore more and more focusing on knowledge 
provided by the universities. Contacts with the universities are just at the beginning, but the 
high potential of collaboration between police and university as well as the necessity of a 
better utilization of this knowledge are recognized. 
Long-term strategies against terrorist threats 23
 
 
The purpose of the dialog with the Muslims is to reach a clear dissociation of the big ma-
jority of fellow Muslim citizens living their faith peacefully from the small group of vio-
lent extremists. In spite of all police efforts and measures bared on alien law, absolute se-
curity cannot be created. Particularly the high efforts of the investigations and the rising 
personnel costs set limits to the constitutional state. Police itself is not able to solve the 
problem on their own. A permanent exchange of ideas, integration sought from both sides 
and the attempt to attend to these problems already in the countries of origin are in great 
demand. 
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4. Counter-Terrorism measures from the cities’ perspective 
Beyond long-term strategies against terrorist threats in particular larger cities - as main 
targets of terrorist attacks – representatives on all local levels have to prepare and take 
steps to minimize the immediate terrorist threat on the one hand and the negative effects of 
an attack on the other hand.  
This chapter will focus on concrete measures of urban terrorism prevention in one of the 
largest German cities (Munich) from a municipal point of view and all aspects of crisis 
management in case of a terrorist attack in a smaller city (Tübingen) from an aid organisa-
tion’s point of view.  
4.1 Security and order within large cities9 
 
The co-operation between all local authorities is necessary in order to manage crisis situa-
tions and to reduce the success rate of and the harm after a terrorist attack. Some of the 
following measures are taken in all German cities; some are specific for the city of Mu-
nich. 
The revision of national laws 
On January 1, 2002 the new counter-terrorism law became effective in Germany and a new 
legal basis was created by extending the reasons for expulsion of people from so-called 
rogue nations. The classification of those nations was determined by administrative regula-
tions of the Federal Ministry of Interior and the Department for Foreign Affairs.  
Now identity-securing measures, e.g. the collection of biometrical data and voice re-
cordings, are possible. In addition it is possible to co-operate with other agencies in visa 
procedures of members of rogue states, if there are any reasons, which would perhaps op-
pose a visa distribution.  
According to the modified residence law an expulsion of a foreigner is now possible, if an 
endangerment of the Free Democratic Basic Order or the state security is detectable or if 
the person belongs to (or supports) a terrorist organization and/or takes part in politically 
motivated acts of violence. Also crimes against peace or humanity, the attempt to recruit 
others to join a terrorist group or agitation are valid reasons to banish someone.  
If foreigners do not leave the country voluntarily or can not be banished because of several 
reasons, extensive monitoring measures can be arranged, which limit the radius of action 
of the concerned persons substantially. Foreigner authorities are responsible for the execu-
tion of the measures. The counter-terrorism law was put in action by a specialized working 
group of the foreigner authority in Munich. Since March 2003, 20000 security questionings 
have been accomplished by the local authorities. 2000 cases were examined by other secu-
rity authorities. About 100 of these cases led to safety discussions within the government 
of Bavaria. 54 termination of residence notifications were issued, 12 suggestions regarding 
a termination were send to the legal supervision authority. At present three cases are su-
                                                 
9 The following comments are based on the lecture “Safety and order in the field of non-police danger pre-
vention in the city (Munich)” by Wilfried Blume-Beyerle, Head of the Department of Public Law and Order 
in Munich. 
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pervised and taken care of and 11 procedures are pending. In one out of 22 cases adminis-
trative judicial contentious proceedings were introduced. 
In the context of the working group BIRGIT (identification and feedback of dangerous 
people from the range of the Islamic terrorism groups) new forms of co-operation between 
the authorities are being developed. The aim of this working group is the banishing of dan-
gerous Islamic people and/or to limit their scope of action by consistent application of the 
current law as far as possible.  
Regarding the mentioned counter-terrorism law working groups like BIRGIT have the pos-
sibility for foreigner authorities, the police and constitution authorities to cooperate in a 
particularly powerful way and with a short official routine. Throughout Bavaria the work-
ing group BIRGIT works on over 60 individual cases - almost all of them resulted in the 
expulsion of dangerous people. The consistent application of the current laws led to the 
fact that all observed followers of the group of Ansar al Islam had to leave Munich. This 
"Bavarian model", which is based on detailed questionings and an intensive co-operation 
with the security authorities, has been taken over by other states of the Federal Republic in 
the meantime. 
Safety and security measures at large events 
The FIFA Word Cup 2006 in Germany was a large event. Numerous measures were raised 
and restrictions created in order to defuse the special endangerment situation as far as pos-
sible. The Public Viewing Points in the cities were fenced and the number of visitors was 
dependently limited to the size of the area (loudspeakers were attached for the information 
of the visitors). Entrance controls were intensified in order to prevent taking-along danger-
ous objects or weapons. It was tried to achieve a visible and clear presence of security au-
thorities on an operational level. Also so-called wave breakers and additional emergency 
routes were built. It was not allowed to bring glass bottles or to sell alcohol. Besides that, 
video monitoring devices were operated depending on the specific area. 
Video monitoring (CCTV) 
Especially large events like the annual Oktoberfest in Munich or the visit of the pope in 
2006 are obviously explosive. As one safety tool the video monitoring was developed and 
gradually improved over the last years. The importance of video monitoring has become 
visible after the successful identification of the suitcase bombers of Koblenz and Dortmund 
in July 2006 via video monitoring.  
The Conference of the Ministers of the Interior is planning to intensify the monitoring of 
the main stations, ports and airports as well as Christmas markets of larger cities (after the 
successfully prevented attack on the Christmas market in Strasbourg). In Munich the 
Christmas market on the Marienplatz was under surveillance of video cameras.  
Security concept of the public suburban traffic 
After 9-11 a new safety concept for the suburban traffic was developed in Munich. Since 
there are about 460 million passengers per year, a strict personal and luggage control like 
at the airport is not possible. The concentration thereby lays on the analysis of organiza-
tional processes from the security official’s point of view, on the examination of structural-
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technical measures and the linkage between technical and organizational measures. Fur-
thermore the staff was sensitized by comprehensive training courses in order to be able to 
recognize dangerous situations. A control committee, which evaluates risks and specifies 
action areas supervises conversion and writes monthly reports to the management. It is 
responsible for the new safety conception. So far the production of the risk matrix, as well 
as the new conception of the emergency and crisis management is accomplished. 
Security concept of the power supply 
The security situation in all ranges of the power supply, e.g. electricity, drinking water and 
gas is of particular importance for each city. In Munich the entrance controls to the techni-
cal plants were made safer by attaching appropriate protection devices. In case of a terror-
ist invasion, it is still possible to prevent an escalation with the help of the master control 
station.  
Due to the inner city power stations, Munich has the possibility to re-establish the current 
basic supply after a black out independently of the European electricity networks after ap-
proximately three hours. 
Within the range of the water supply there are constantly occupied control stations, which 
can offer a constant quality assurance and also examine the water quality with bio indica-
tors (e.g. by fishes). Therefore an early realization of any impurities is possible and the 
control station can block the distribution of water directly. In addition there are workers, 
which can be activated immediately in case of operational disturbances and who are 
equipped with appropriate equipment in order to locate and eliminate disturbances.  
In Munich the local authorities could react by structural, technical, organizational measures 
to all kinds of the supplying interruption in such a way that every interruption is waived in 
short time. Special attention applies thereby also for the safety of communication struc-
tures in the case of a large terrorist event. The city of Munich has two complete master 
control stations in order to keep up the communication in case of an emergency. Independ-
ent from the availability of the usual telecommunication structures there exists an operating 
radio. The present analogue operating radio is replaced by a digital system. 
Bioterrorism 
After 9-11 and the following anthrax threat bio terrorism was high ranked on the political 
agenda. In order to be able to work against attacks of bio terror, an infectiological constant 
call team was established, which can give comprehensive procedural instructions.  
A regional authority centre and a local smallpox alarm plan were established. Now a large 
number of infected people can be adequately handled at the same time. The aim of the 
smallpox alarm plan is a fast inoculation of the entire population for the prevention of an 
epidemic disease with millions of dead persons. The infrastructural conditions (e.g. inocu-
lation sites) can be used also in case of other epidemic situations and events of bio terror-
ism, which requires a fast inoculation or expenditure for antibiotics. The national influ-
enza-pandemy-plan was successfully enforced on a local level. Here the linking of differ-
ent participants with the goal of the maintenance of the public order and the medical sup-
plying structures was located in the centre. These plans are applicable also in the case of an 
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occurrence of SARS or other natural cause - depending on which epidemic situation is pre-
sent, appropriate planning modules can be accessed. 
Disaster control 
The disaster control, which is one of the most important work areas of the municipalities 
for counter-terrorism, was adapted to the new endangerment situation. A view on so-called 
large damage events of the last decades points out clearly the new dimension of the Islamic 
terrorism and underlines impressively the necessity for new security concepts. In case of 
emergency local level has to expect approximately 1000 hurt persons. For this purpose a 
sifting procedure from the cold war was led in modernized form, which is to ensure an 
efficient supply for the hurt people in the case of a mass accumulation (MAHP). It con-
cerns the fast finding of massively wounded with different degrees of injury. An effective 
transport system from the crime scene to the hospitals was developed. Also considerations 
to the qualitative psychosocial support would have to be employed. An important step is 
thereby the improvement of the collection and bundling of personal data of the hurt, in 
order to improve the information system for family members and media.  
Of crucial importance is primarily a technically and personnel well equipped operational 
control station, which can lead a large number of task forces across a long period. A reac-
tive municipality needs therefore an administrative internal crisis staff, in which also ex-
tensive decisions with political relevance could be taken. The municipalities became an 
elementary component of non-police safety architecture following a regional law regula-
tion and independently seized measures. 
4.2 Crisis management in case of a terrorist attack10 
Changes of the political conditions in Europe (east west relations, reunification in Ger-
many) – both financial and structural – were accompanied by drastic changes in the civil-
ian and disaster control, in particular the assistance structures changed within the range of 
the emergency service in the past years. Adjustments of the performance of the German 
Red Cross were therefore necessary. 
Multi-functional employment units are created, which are able to be coordinated fast and 
flexible in a large damage event together with the emergency service and fire-brigades that 
already exist. Within the Red Cross the direct binding of the medical group of the em-
ployment unit to the emergency service as well as the integration of the group of care into 
the assistance closes the existing supply deficit between the emergency service and the 
disaster control. 
Competencies and legal bases for the emergency services in Germany are in the hand of 
the federal states. The basis for the general rescue supply is regulated by the national 
emergency service laws regulating the equipment of ambulances, medical material and 
other necessities needed in a case of emergency. Personnel occupation and qualification for 
rescue physicians, medics, aids, first responders and honorary aids are an important and 
urgent task of the emergency services guarantor. Fire-brigades and relief organizations are 
the main emergency service providers in Baden-Württemberg. The districts in Baden-
Württemberg are organized in emergency service regions. There are four large Red Cross 
                                                 
10 The following comments are based on the lecture “Crisis management in case of a terrorist attack” by 
Rainer Wizenmann, Emergency service leader at the German Red Cross, Tübingen. 
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rescue service areas: Tübingen, Mössingen, Rottenburg, and Ergenzingen. This chapter 
focuses on one of these areas: Tübingen. 
 A closer look at the district of Tübingen 
With its size of 519 square kilometers and its 214784 inhabitants the district of Tübingen 
with its specialized clinics has a special stand within the rescue services. Tübingen offers 
an extensive medical care with its clinical center for surgery, radiology, orthopedics, neu-
rology and anesthesia, and among others also the specialized hospital for tropical diseases 
and the clinic with professional association.  
Even though there are many specialized clinics in Tübingen, one should not ignore the fact 
that just three polytraumatised patients would still mean an almost unmanageable task to 
the medical staff of any high profiled clinic. 
Procedures in case of a mass accumulation of hurt persons (MAHP) 
A terrorist attack can lead to a multiplicity of hurt persons, which are mastered by the 
emergency services up to a certain measure. It is important to have a definition of mass 
accumulation to gain insight of the problem that emergency services are confronted with. 
A mass accumulation follows an emergency with a larger number of hurt or sick people as 
well as other harmed and concerned persons which can be rescued and supplied with exist-
ing and applicable reproaching of the emergency services. In case of a terrorist attack the 
emergency services presume a large number of hurt people. 
The main goal in the strategy of the rescue measures is to restore the individual supply of 
the hurt or sick persons as fast as possible. An example of a MAHP was the train derail-
ment of Eschede, Germany, where the hurt and harmed persons were quickly rescued and 
brought to specialized clinics and were treated according to their injuries. In order to be 
able to do this, alarm and organization plans for different deployment stages are necessary.  
At this point some terms must be differentiated according to the alarm code levels and the 
respective person in charge. Certain terms need to be differentiated according to their 
alarm code level and the following responsibility.   
Alarm code 1:   Emergency situation is handled by the chief of staff rescue physi-
cian and the paramedics. 
Alarm code 2:  MAHP is handled by chief of organization and chief of rescue 
physicians. 
Alarm code 3:  Large damage event is handled by chief of organization and the 
chief of rescue physicians and the guidance troop. 
Alarm code 4:  Disaster, is regarded as an act of administration and requires the 
declaration of the chief executive leader. 
 
To understand the procedures and the institutions involved in all the different levels of e-
mergency cases one need to look closer at the structure of deployment. As soon as the 
message of an emergency situation reaches the master center of the Red Cross in Tübin-
gen, the level of alarm code is being determined and the appropriate service team, e.g. the 
police, fire-brigade, rescue teams, SWAT teams, disaster control teams are send out to the 
scene of damage with their respective special rescue equipment. 
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Different amounts of hurt people and sizes of events are regulated by different relief orga-
nizations and therefore by different laws. There are the disaster control law and the emer-
gency service law and also the fire-brigade law.  
Concrete measures after a terrorist attacks 
The emergency services and fire-brigades in Germany do not have enough experience 
about what to do after a terrorist attack. The lack of experience is evident when it comes to 
the problem of self-endangerment of the task forces through explosives, biological, chemi-
cal weapons or in case of special injury samples, e.g. amputations, and with the specific 
characteristic of posttraumatic stress disorder of victims and rescuers alike. Other problems 
occur in cases with several deployment scenes, destroyed infrastructures, communication 
and blocked traffic routes. 
Necessary measures in order to counteract this lack of experience are the concentration of 
the available forces for the deployment and training the rescuers in close-to-reality exer-
cises. Another measure is the qualification of the task forces, especially all those who are 
not active regularly in the emergency services. Constant coordination of the deployment 
strategies with all safety organizations involved helps to avoid friction losses within the 
rescue teams. Problems may occur with too many rescuers at the scene and also untrained 
layman helpers. This can be avoided simply by the marking of the wanted and needed 
helper. In order to do that requested helper should announce themselves to the directing 
center before going to the scene. 
With the new financial billing restraints for the hospitals (diagnosis referred lump sum) 
installed by the Federal Department of Health, economic profitability obligations will im-
mensely shape medical supplying levels. A necessary reserve for the accomplishment of a 
mass accumulation of hurt people with hospital beds and the supply of emergency doctors 
and emergency surgeons from the hospitals are not at all intended in the case lump sum 
system and is therefore threatened to be lost. The same applies to the emergency services. 
The pure, at “normal” extent of utilization referred reproaching of task forces and re-
sources, leads inevitably to the dismantling of necessary capacities for the special case of a 
terrorist attack. Looking at the experiences of other emergency services (in Germany and 
abroad) with cases of MAHP by terrorist attacks should lead to a better coordination of 
organizations, especially the emergency service, disaster control and German federal 
armed forces.  
The hospitals should be equipped and trained on emergency plans for the case of a MAHP. 
Civilians should be trained in first aid on regular terms for the case of accidents. Very im-
portant to be looked at is the self-protection of the coordinated rescuer, also the ability in 
civilians to practice first-aid and knowing about simple behavior pattern in emergency 
situations. The media should be instructed not to give out uncoordinated information in 
order to avoid misinformation or even mass panic. There is urgent need for action, espe-
cially according to the fact, that security services have gone through a change of attitude 
towards terrorist attacks. Preparation is needed, not only prevention.   
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5. Conclusion 
Practical conclusions for prevention and aftercare of a terrorist attack were one of the main 
goals of the 4th local seminar in Tübingen. In the final plenary discussion the call for inter-
national as well as national and local co-operation of agencies and authorities has been 
common conviction among all the participants.  
One of the major subjects according to the conference is the question for the theoretical 
validity of models and initiatives against terrorism and the possibilities of improvement. 
From the practical point of view it is a strategic problem, namely the security of cities. In 
the face of terrorist acts the definition and perception of a city changes. Terrorists perceive 
cities as a system of targets, obstacles like monitoring systems and escape routes. In this 
way it is of utmost importance to understand how a terrorist perceives a city. Creating suc-
cessful strategies of prevention with respect to that fact is a lot easier. The same goes for 
the whole country where there are no walls and no control measures. On the other hand 
Europe has got a plenty of resources. It is weak though because the European cities are not 
able to imagine themselves as targets. The protection of a city is not mainly based on fi-
nancial support to guarantee measures of prevention. The understanding of terrorist organi-
zations has to become more sufficient. We are still not able to identify reasons and targets 
(lack of profiling). The question to be asked is: what are the goals of terrorist groups? The 
best technical equipment to chase after potential perpetrators (like digital walls, monitoring 
etc.) is useless without understanding the terrorists. 
Also seen as a great problem is the inexperience in terror prevention of the local police 
authorities. A challenge for today is to coach the responders on a local and international 
level because these are the levels terrorist groups are working on. This includes also the 
training in internet monitoring. Another problem mentioned are the extra security meas-
ures. People get disturbed in their daily life more and more through security. This should 
be pointed out as one of the goals of terrorists. The police authorities in the city of Munich 
class only 0.1 to 1 % of the Muslim inhabitants as potential terrorists. But what does this 
classification mean to the other 99% and the concepts of integration? Each section of the 
official authorities is playing its part in the integration of immigrants (education, health 
system, urban planning). Integration is based on a closely local level and helps to prevent 
terrorism. 
Though there is a need of transnational cooperation (experts, material and money) the local 
prevention of terrorism must be adapted to the specific surrounding. One always has to 
keep in mind that terrorists are capable of planning an attack with very few money. An-
other important remark is the role of the society in education of the youth. It is needful to 
extinguish exclusion and triggering issues to participate a fundamental group. In that sense 
policy has to cooperate with Muslim groups. There is an effect of the classification “1% of 
the Muslims are terrorists” on the rest of the Muslim community. Cooperation with Mus-
lim groups mustn’t have the effect of spies in the mosques. Anyway there is a dichotomy 
between discrimination and so-called political correctness. In reference to this thought an 
update of instruments used in terrorism prevention is helpful. In any case, policy always 
has to be orientated according to human rights. 
As for the traditional crime prevention scheme terrorism prevention need to focus on pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary (together with situational) prevention. All levels are of high 
importance to work against certain democracy hostile attitudes and acts. At the same time 
all societal actors must work together for the goal of the prevention of terrorism. That 
mean on local, city, state, nation, European and world level. 
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6. Appendix A 
Here you can find some newspaper articles dealing with the conference: 
Reutlinger Generalanzeiger, November 22, 2006 
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Schwäbisches Tagblatt, November 28, 2006  
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Reutlinger Generalanzeiger, November 29, 2006 
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Schwäbisches Tagblatt, November 29, 2006  
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BwWoche, December 4, 2006 (3rd paragraph only) 
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7. APPENDIX B (CAT Program) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project: Cities against Terrorism (CAT) –  
How to Deal with Terrorist Threats? 
Training Local Representatives in Facing Terrorism 
 
Conference in Germany 
 
 
Date:    27-28 November 2006 
Location:   Conference and Guesthouse of the Max Planck Institute Tübingen   
Spemannstraße 36 - 72076 Tübingen  
Languages:  German and English (simultaneous translation provided) 
More information:  http://www.cat-tuebingen.de.gg 
 
 
27. November 2006 
 
08.30 – 09.30  Reception / Empfang 
 
09.30 – 10.00  Introduction / Einführung 
 
Address of welcome to the participants 
Hans-Jürgen Kerner, University of Tübingen, Germany 
 
Presentation of the CAT-Project and the team, link between this 
seminar and three preceding seminars in Bristol, Lisbon and Ka-
towice 
Justyna Kulach & Frédéric Esposito, EFUS, Paris/Geneva 
 
 
10.00 – 11.00 From Theory to real life: Practical issues in preventing Terror-
ism  
(Von der Theorie zur Praxis: Praktische Fragen der Terrorismusprä-
vention) 
Silvia Ciotti-Galletti, University for Foreigners, Perugia, Italy 
 
11.15 – 12.15 The structure of a terrorist organisation (PKK) and its activities 
in the European Union  
(Die Struktur einer terroristischen Vereinigung (PKK) und ihre Ak-
tivitäten in der EU) 
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Ahmet S Yayla, Ankara Police Department, Antiterrorism Division, 
Turkey 
 
12.15   Lunch / Mittagessen 
 
13.30 – 14.30 Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen – Zusammenarbeit zwischen 
Muslimen und den Sicherheitsbehörden in Deutschland 
(Confidence-Building Measures – Cooperation between Muslims 
and the Police in Germany)   
Mounir Azzaoui, Central Council of Muslims in Germany 
 
14.30 – 15.30  Polizeiliche Terrorismusprävention in Hessen auf lokaler Ebene 
   (Police Terrorism Prevention in the State of Hesse on Local Level) 
   Gottfried Störmer, Landeskriminalamt Hessen 
  
15.30 Break / Pause 
 
16.00 – 17.00  Terrorism through Suicide Bombings 
 (Terroranschläge durch Selbstmordattentäter) 
Maria Alvanou, ITSTIME Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Is-
sues and Managing Emergencies 
 
28. November 2006 
 
09.30 – 10.00  Reception / Empfang 
 
10.00 – 11.00  Krisenmanagement nach einem Katastrophen-
fall/Terroranschlag 
   (Crisis Management in case of a terrorist attack) 
   Rainer Wizenmann, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Tübingen 
 
11.00 – 12.00 Terrorismusbekämpfung in Baden-Württemberg aus Sicht der 
Polizei  
(Prevention of Terrorism in the State of Baden-Württemberg  
from the Perspective of the Police) 
Kriminaloberrat Klaus Ziwey, Landespolizeipräsidium Baden-
Württemberg 
 
12.00   Lunch / Mittagessen 
 
13.00 – 14.00 Sicherheit und Ordnung im Bereich der nichtpolizeilichen Ge-
fahrenabwehr einer Großstadt am Beispiel der Landeshaupt-
stadt München 
(Safety and order in the field of non-police danger prevention in the 
city (Munich)) 
   Wilfried Blume-Beyerle, Kreisverwaltungsreferat München 
 
14.00 – 14.05  Central questions for the working groups (WG)  
(Aufgaben und Leitfragen für die Arbeitsgruppen) 
Marc Coester & Klaus Bott, University of Tübingen 
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14.05 – 15.15   WG 1: The logistic of Terrorism  
(Die Logistik des Terrorismus) 
Chair: Daniele Zotti, University Centre for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (CSSI), University of Florence, Italy 
Co-Chair: Herbert Müller, Landesverfassungsschutz Baden-
Württemberg, Stuttgart (Kompetenzgruppe Islamismus) 
 
WG 2: Possibilities of optimized co-operation in preventing Ter-
rorism  
(Möglichkeiten der optimierten Zusammenarbeit in der Terrorismus-
prävention) 
Chair: Gottfried Störmer, Landeskriminalamt Hessen 
 
WG 3: Emergency acts and crisis management after a terrorist  
attack  
(Konkrete Arbeiten nach einer Terrorattacke) 
   Chair: Rainer Wizenmann, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Tübingen 
 
15.15   Break / Pause 
 
15.45 – 16.00 Summary of all working groups (5 minutes each) 
 
16.00 – 17.00  Plenary Discussion:  
How to deal with terrorist threats at regional level –  
Possibilities of prevention and emergency acts  
(Wie können sich Städte gegen terroristische Attacken schützen oder 
im Fall eines Anschlags darauf reagieren) 
 Silvia Ciotti-Galletti 
Ahmet S Yayla 
Wilfried Blume-Beyerle  
Daniele Zotti 
Mounir Azzaoui 
Maria Alvanou 
Chair: Prof. Hans-Jürgen Kerner 
 
17.00   Conclusion / Fazit 
 
Evaluation and comments from previous workshops 
Frédéric Esposito, EFUS, Geneva 
 
Final remarks 
Hans-Jürgen Kerner, University of Tübingen 
 
17.15   End / Ende 
 
 
Victims of terrorist acts, Pilot project, 2005 
European Commission, Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security 
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